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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

A DRAMA OF DEVELOPMENT: GARY OLSON ON
STANLEY FISH
Book Review of GARY A. OLSON, STANLEY FISH, AMERICA’S
ENFANT TERRIBLE: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY
Richard Mullender†

INTRODUCTION
Gary Olson has two broad aims in Stanley Fish, America’s Enfant
Terrible. Like all biographers, he seeks to leave his readers with an
understanding of the personality under scrutiny. To this end, he variously
describes Fish as exhibiting “intellectual fearlessness,”1 as an “academic
entrepreneur,”2 and as “never [having] turned down a good (verbal)
fight.”3 Olson also seeks to bring into focus the significance of Fish’s
academic contribution—which spans a number of disciplines (most
obviously, literature and law). The focus of this review will be on Olson’s
second aim. But before we turn to Olson on Fish-the-academic, a few
words on Fish-the-person seem apt (since they have, as we will see,
relevance to his academic contribution). A recent novel by Laurent Binet
throws light on the force of Fish’s personality. In The Seventh Function
† Professor of Law and Legal Theory, Newcastle Law School, Newcastle University, England.
I owe thanks to David Campbell, Conall Mallory, David McGrogan, Emilia Mickiewicz, Patrick
O’Callaghan, Ole Pedersen, and Ian Ward for their comments on earlier drafts of this review. I also
benefited from a number of conversations with T.T. Arvind on the topic of Stanley Fish’s
contribution and from Reuben E. Dizengoff’s editorial guidance.
1 GARY A. OLSON, STANLEY FISH, AMERICA’S ENFANT TERRIBLE: THE AUTHORIZED
BIOGRAPHY 157 (2016).
2 Olson, supra note 1, at 118.
3 Id. at 159.
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of Language, Binet presents his readers with an array of political and
academic luminaries from the real world.4 They include Francois
Mitterrand, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu,
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, and
John Searle. Binet places in their midst a fictive academic, Professor
Morris Zapp. Zapp’s presence in this august company makes sense since
he, like Mitterrand and the others, has an interest in what Binet (following
Roman Jakobson) calls “the seventh function of language.” Binet and
Jakobson mean by “the seventh function of language,” its usefulness as a
rhetorical device with which to reshape the social contexts we inhabit.5
But just as language’s “seventh function” is not Binet’s creation, neither
is Zapp. Zapp owes his existence to David Lodge, an English academic
and novelist. Lodge breathed life into Zapp on the pages of his campus
novel, Changing Places.6 However, to call Lodge Zapp’s creator may be
to engage in overstatement. This is because Stanley Fish was the
inspiration for the acute, pugnacious, and endlessly energetic Zapp.
Lodge first saw the outlines of Zapp when he and Fish worked together
in Berkeley’s English Department in the 1960s.
The force of Fish’s personality becomes apparent when we
recognize that he prompted Lodge to usher Zapp into existence and this
fictional alter ego now lives in the work of a second novelist.7 To this we
should add the further point that Zapp features in the works of Lodge and
Binet as an academic who possesses uncommon powers of expression
(that are intimately connected with force of personality).8 These are
powers that Zapp shares with Fish (who is, as Olson notes, “a selfconfessed connoisseur” of well-wrought sentences9). A powerful
personality that is “difficult to characterize” and “a storied career”
explain why Olson has devoted close attention to Fish.10 While the
resulting biography is illuminating, there are reasons for thinking that we
can press the analysis it offers further. To this end, we will draw, later,
on the concept of political anthropology. But before turning to this matter,
we must examine the contents of Olson’s book (and Fish’s academic
contribution) in some detail.

4 LAURENT BINET, THE SEVENTH FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE (Sam Taylor trans., Farrar, Straus
and Giroux 2017) (2015).
5 Roman Jakobson, Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics, in STYLE IN LANGUAGE 350–
77 (T.A. Seebok, ed., 1960).
6 DAVID LODGE, CHANGING PLACES: A TALE OF TWO CAMPUSES 45 (1979).
7 Morris Zapp has recently taken up residence in a work of modern history. See RICHARD
VINEN, THE LONG ’68: RADICAL PROTEST AND ITS ENEMIES 63–64 (2018).
8 See Binet, supra note 4, at 242, 246; Lodge, supra note 6, at 43–45.
9 Olson, supra note 1, at 151; see also STANLEY FISH, HOW TO WRITE A SENTENCE AND HOW
TO READ ONE 3 (2011) (where Fish identifies himself as “belong[ing] to the tribe of sentencewatchers” and says that he seeks “performances of a certain skill at the highest level”).
10 Olson, supra note 1, at 54, 152.
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BECOMING AN ACADEMIC PLAYER
Olson dwells at length on Fish’s early life. We learn that each of his
parents possessed a “powerful” personality.11 This meant that “the Fish
household often erupted in contentious bickering and arguing.”12 This
was a context that Fish, on occasion, found “distressing.”13 However, it
did not impede his academic development. While he was not “bookish,”
he secured a place in Classical High School—a high quality
establishment in his home town, Providence, Rhode Island.14 Here, he
studied Latin for four years, as well as French and German, and
developed a facility with language that would serve him well in his
academic career. He also fell under the influence of an “inspiring
and . . . somewhat aloof” teacher, Sarah Flanagan.15 In this stimulating
environment, Fish went on to secure grades that would earn him entry to
the Ivy League (as an English student in the University of Pennsylvania).
Just as Fish opened himself up to Flanagan’s influence in Classical
High, he responded positively to the guidance of Professors Maurice
Johnson and Arthur H. Scouten at Penn. They encouraged him to believe
that he could one day be a “player”—an academic with the ability to
influence the thinking of others by shaping the fields within which he
would work.16 Johnson and Scouten did this because they recognized that
Fish “had an unusual talent for literary interpretation.”17 They also
encouraged him to apply to graduate school at Yale. While Fish’s
application was successful, it presented him with a dilemma. He also had
it in mind to study law and had “scored higher on the LSAT [Law School
Admission Test] than he had on the Graduate Record Examination.”18
Ultimately, he opted for Yale and English. As at Classical High and Penn,
he came under powerful formative influences. Olson numbers among
these influences the “rigorous and grueling” William Wimsatt—who
delighted in the knowledge that some of his colleagues considered his
“polemical” and “critical” stances “too combative.”19 As Olson unfolds
this account of Fish’s early life and education, he conveys a sense of
growing momentum. We see it in, for example, Fish’s decision, while at
Yale, to write a dissertation on John Skelton. Olson tells us that “Skelton
was a Catholic poet living at a time when England was clearly turning
away from Catholicism.”20 Skelton thus gave Fish the opportunity to
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 33.
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dwell on a site of conflict (Sixteenth Century England) in which a
multiplicity of sharply divergent views found expression.
ZAPPING THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY
The momentum on display in Fish’s response to Skelton grows as
Olson traces the steps of his career as an academic. While in his first
academic post (in Berkeley’s English Department), Fish developed
expertise in a new area. The inspiration for this change in direction came
from his dissertation supervisor at Yale, Talbot Donaldson. Donaldson
had told Fish, “‘[I]f you’re going to get anywhere in this profession, you
are going to have to write . . . on a major figure.’”21 Fish acted on this
advice by becoming a Miltonist. John Milton galvanized him. Olson (in
one of the most intense passages in his biography) carries us into this
hinge moment. He describes Fish reading passages of the Englishman’s
work and asking himself, “‘How could anybody have done that?’”22 With
Milton’s linguistic dexterity as a source of inspiration, Fish produced his
first two books. The first concerned John Skelton’s poetry and grew out
of his dissertation. In the second, Surprised by Sin: The Reader in
Paradise Lost, Fish focused not just on Milton but on the experience of
those who read his works.23 He thus made a contribution to a nascent
body of thought known as reader-response criticism.
The momentum on display in Fish’s first two books grows more
apparent when Olson turns to Fish’s next academic post, at Johns
Hopkins University (which he took up in 1974). While at Johns Hopkins,
Fish published an essay—Interpreting the Variorum—that clinched his
reputation as a player.24 In this essay, Fish introduced the concept of an
“interpretive community.”25 This concept made it possible for him to
drive home the message that, when seeking to make sense of a text, we
should pay attention to the group whose members ascribe significance to
it. He thus moved the center of interpretive gravity away from texts and
the intentions of their authors to an intersubjective reference point. This
message rang out again four years later with the publication of Is There a
Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (a
collection of essays that included Interpreting the Variorum).26
Alongside this development, Olson sets another that would have
significance for legal academe (not least in the field of interpretation).
During his time at Johns Hopkins, Fish began to devote close attention to
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id.
Id. at 45.
STANLEY FISH, SURPRISED BY SIN: THE READER IN PARADISE LOST (2d. ed. 1997).
Stanley Fish, Interpreting the Variorum, 2 CRITICAL INQUIRY 465–85 (1976).
Id. at 483.
STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES (1980).
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law. This led him (in 1976) to secure the post of adjunct professor at the
University of Maryland’s School of Law. In this role, he forged an
alliance with Kenneth S. Abraham (a law professor at Maryland) and
Walter Benn Michaels (a literary theorist). This trio taught a seminar
together on “Theories of Interpretation.”27 Fish’s subsequent essays on
law brought him into the orbit of Ronald Dworkin, another prominent
academic who had grown up in Providence. This gives Olson the
opportunity to recount the details of an exchange between Fish and
Dworkin that took place during a conference at the University of Chicago.
They each spoke on the subject of interpretation. Olson tells us that
“Dworkin deftly cut [Fish] to ribbons.”28 He adds that “[n]ever before—
and never since—had [Fish] been so unable to gain the upper hand.”29 In
this moment, Fish resolved to “get” Dworkin in print.30
This is something Fish has done on a number of occasions.31
Moreover, he has done so in terms that have been academically fruitful.
This response to a searing experience tells us much about Fish’s
character. It is a character Olson brings into focus when he describes
Fish’s “combativeness.”32 Here, Olson describes a disposition that finds
expression in an “uncompromising attitude” towards “intellectual
disputes.”33 He adds that Fish sees these disputes as “a serious business”
in which participants must overcome the impulse to be “polite” and tackle
others’ “‘mistakes’” head on.34 This approach to his work makes Fish
sound very much like Morris Zapp when he says that “the object of the
[academic] exercise” is “to put a definitive stop to the production
of . . . garbage.”35 Moreover, Fish has confirmed (in an essay from 2012)
that Zapp’s approach to his work is his own. For he has stated that the
intention to be “decisive, comprehensive, . . . [and] definitive” is at work
in the arguments he builds.36 However, a taste for combat is only one
dimension of Fish’s character. Olson recognizes this when he describes
Fish (as we noted earlier) as an “academic entrepreneur.”37 This aspect of
Fish’s make-up goes a long way towards explaining his decision to move
(in 1985) from Johns Hopkins to the post of Arts and Sciences Professor
of English and Law at Duke University. A year after his arrival at Duke,
27
28
29
30
31

Olson, supra note 1, at 67.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Still Wrong After All These Years, 6 L. & PHIL. 401 (1987); Stanley
Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L. J. 1773 (1987).
32 Olson, supra note 1, at 154.
33 Id. at 155.
34 Id. at 155, 159.
35 Lodge, supra note 6, at 44.
36 Stanley Fish, The Digital Humanities and the Transcending of Mortality, in THINK AGAIN:
CONTRARIAN REFLECTIONS ON LIFE, CULTURE, POLITICS, RELIGION, LAW, AND EDUCATION 343
(2015).
37 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Fish became Chair of the English Department and immediately set about
raising its standing. Olson tells us that he did so by recruiting a group of
prominent academics (including Barbara Herrnstein Smith and Frederic
Jameson) to a department that had previously enjoyed the reputation of a
worthy also-ran. While at Duke, Fish acquired the reputation of a mover
and shaker—with some commentators hurling the brickbat of “‘crass
entrepreneurialism’” at him.38 Even after a move (in the late 1990s) to the
University of Illinois at Chicago, Terry Eagleton described him as “the
Donald Trump of American academia.”39
Signs of entrepreneurial chutzpah had, however, been apparent in
Fish’s approach to his work long before his move to Duke. In 1971, he
seized the opportunity to trade places with a French professor who was
visiting Berkeley. This made it possible for him to deepen his knowledge
of poststructuralism—a subject that had “sparked intense interest” in the
United States following a conference at Johns Hopkins University in
1966.40 Olson describes the summer Fish spent in Paris as “a major
turning point in his intellectual development.”41 He immediately grasped
the relevance of post-structuralism to his work on interpretation (e.g., the
assault it mounts on belief in extra-systemic (or absolute) determinants
of meaning).42 When he returned to Berkeley, he wove this body of
thought into the fabric of a course that embraced, inter alia, stylistic
analysis, speech-act theory, and reader-response criticism.43 Here, we can
see Fish engaging in a process of critical reflection that would yield his
later insights on interpretive communities (as sources of intersubjective
meaning). Moreover, this process carried him in an interdisciplinary
direction that would prove to be as much anthropological as it was
literary.
As Olson presents his account of Fish’s life and career, we find
ourselves contemplating a drama of development. We see this drama
unfold as Fish responds to the guidance of Flanagan at Classical High,
Johnson and Scouten at Penn, and Donaldson at Yale. Likewise, we see
it in Fish’s response to Milton and poststructuralism. However, Olson
could have made the intensity and open-endedness of this drama more
apparent. Its intensity is plain to see in Interpreting the Variorum (where
Fish only succeeds in bringing the concept of an “interpretive
community” into clear view in the essay’s final section).44 The openendedness of this drama is also apparent when we recognize that Fish has
38
39

Olson, supra note 1, at 96.
Terry Eagleton, The Estate Agent, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Mar. 2, 2000, at 10–11; see also
Olson, supra note 1, at 96.
40 Olson, supra note 1, at 54. Olson notes that Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Jacques
Lacan were among those who attended this conference. Id.
41 Id.
42 See JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 19 (Alan Bass trans., 1981).
43 Olson, supra note 1, at 56.
44 FISH, supra note 26, at 147–48, 167–73.
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presented us with a contribution whose components stand in complex
relations about which it is possible to say more. Two of the matters on
which we have fastened attention (interpretive communities and
interdisciplinarity) yield a basis on which to explain why this is the case.
In combination, they make it possible to bring out a feature of Fish’s
academic contribution that merits close analysis. This is a political
anthropology that informs his writings. Before turning to this topic, we
must look more closely at what Fish has to say on interpretive
communities and interdisciplinarity.
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY
On Fish’s account, the significance that a text (or other object of
interpretation) possesses (at any moment) derives from the understanding
of it that the members of an interpretive community share. A legal
example will serve to illustrate this point. The judges whose task it is to
interpret the U.S. Constitution make up an interpretive community. As a
group, they have in common a sense of significance that attaches to
particular provisions. The First Amendment, which establishes a
qualified right to free expression, provides an example of such a
provision. The views judges share on the First Amendment find
expression in a body of case law that identifies the right it establishes as
a “trump” in the sense elaborated (in a number of his works) by Ronald
Dworkin.45 While it is permissible to override such an entitlement, a
judge should not do this on the “minimal” ground that doing so is “likely
to produce, overall, a benefit to the community.”46 Thus the First
Amendment gives judges grounds for excluding from consideration
reasons for action (e.g., the fact that expression is offensive) that might
otherwise justify restrictions on speech.47 These grounds make it possible
for them to identify particular arguments and, likewise, pieces of
evidence as having more or less significance in the disputes they must
resolve. While such an interpretive community stabilizes meaning, this is
not to say that current understandings remain in a state of fixity. Fish
argues that those who participate in the life of an interpretive community
engage in rhetorical performances with the aim of prompting other
members of the group to see norms, pieces of evidence, etc., in a
particular light. But to do this, they have to take as their starting point the

45 See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153–67 (Jeremy Waldron
ed., 1984); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 190–92 (1977); RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 160, 223 (1986).
46 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 45, at 191–92. For an illustration of the
First Amendment operating in the way Dworkin describes, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969).
47 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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“bounded argument space” any such community identifies as existing.48
By going about their business in this way, they have a realistic prospect
of staking out new positions in such a space or of altering its contours on
an incremental basis. Thus, interpretive communities are “constraining,”
if not a “constraint” that binds like a fetter.49
When we bear in mind that Fish worked up his account of
interpretive communities in a literary context and then demonstrated its
applicability to law, the interdisciplinary orientation of this contribution
is immediately apparent. While Olson recognizes its importance, he
might have made it more obvious to his readers by contrasting Fish’s
thinking with that of some prominent jurisprudes. This is a point we can
illustrate by reference to the writings of two very different legal
philosophers, Ronald Dworkin and Hans Kelsen. In Taking Rights
Seriously, Dworkin offers a detailed account of the way in which judges
should resolve “hard cases.”50 Among other things, he argues that they
must attend to “institutional history.”51 This is a phrase that tends to
suggest to lawyers a body of norms that have come into existence along
a lengthy institutional timeline. But Dworkin gestures in the direction of
a wider understanding. For he talks of a “sense of appropriateness” that
grows up among judges, lawyers, and members of the public and is
relevant to the resolution of disputes.52 In his account of interpretive
communities, Fish gives us the tools to develop this point. This is because
institutional history encompasses and gives expression to the
understandings of those who have fashioned the norms that have
relevance to hard cases.53 Just as Fish’s analysis makes it possible for us
to deepen our understanding of institutional history, so too we can use it
to point up the limitations of Kelsen’s thinking. Kelsen is a proponent of
a pure theory of law.54 This theory holds that, in our efforts to grasp the
nature of law, we should only take account of the norms that make up
legal systems. To embrace this view is to fail to grasp that law is an
institution that gains its shape from something other than an assemblage
of norms. This is the community made up of those who usher these norms
into existence and invest them with significance.

48 STANLEY FISH, WINNING ARGUMENTS: WHAT WORKS AND DOESN’T WORK IN POLITICS,
THE BEDROOM, THE COURTROOM, AND THE CLASSROOM 129 (2016).
49 STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO

152 (1994).
50 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 45, at 81–130.
51 Id. at 87, 126.
52 Id. at 40.
53 Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, supra note 31, at 1788–93.
54 HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 1967).

2018]

A DRAMA OF DEVELOPMENT

55

POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
Fish’s account of interpretive community, and the commitment to
interdisciplinarity to which it gives expression, afford a basis on which to
bring out a feature of his contribution that Olson fails to spot. Fish (while
he does not identify himself as such) is a proponent of the communitarian
embeddedness thesis. This thesis states that people owe their practical
outlook and the purposes that invest their lives with significance to the
communities in which they are embedded.55 Thus it is deterministic in
orientation. Our outlook is a function of context. However, Fish has stated
that “the individual” has a capacity for authorship and is not reducible to
the status of a “relay through which messages circulating in [a] network
pass.”56 Moreover, he has identified people as possessing sufficient
agency or will to alter the contexts in which they find themselves. This is
apparent in, for example, his claim that, in legal contexts, “anything, once
a sufficiently elaborated argument is in place, can mean anything.”57
When we juxtapose these features of Fish’s thinking, we bring into focus
a contribution that is fraught with tension. His emphasis on context as a
force that shapes our thinking draws some of its inspiration from and
lends force to the argument (advanced by, inter alios, Roland Barthes)
that we can talk of “the death of the author.”58 But, at the same time, we
find in Fish’s writings an emphasis on what Don DeLillo calls “the human
veer.”59 By this DeLillo means, among other things, the way in which
individuals put a distinctive stamp on the activities in which they engage.
This happens when, for example, a lawyer, who finds the law
“constraining,” is nonetheless able to exploit its malleability by
“bending” it in a new direction.60 Likewise, we see “the human veer”
when a literary scholar finds a propitious moment to displace the
assumptions that hold in place a consensus on a particular text.61
The assertion of will, on the model we find in these examples, leads
Fish to make a universal truth claim. We have it in our power to mobilize
the argumentative resources that exist in literary, legal, and other contexts
in ways that make it possible to undercut the foundations on which they
rest. This becomes apparent when we remember that “anything” can be
55 Simon Caney, Liberalism and Communitarianism: A Misconceived Debate, 40 POL. STUD.
273, 274–79 (1992).
56 Fish, supra note 36, at 345.
57 Fish, supra note 49, at 148.
58 ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE MUSIC TEXT 142–48 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977).
59 DON DELILLO, UNDERWORLD 371 (1997).
60 Fish, supra note 49, at 145; see also ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN
SOCIETY 131 (George Simpson trans., The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois 1960) (1933) (arguing
that “individuation” manifests itself in conformity to the “usages” and “practices” of, for example,
an “occupation” in contexts that are “open for the free play of … initiative”).
61 Stanley Fish, Transmuting the Lump: Paradise Lost, 1942–1979, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL
STUDIES 247–93 (4th prtg. 1999) (1989).
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made to “mean anything” with “a sufficiently elaborated argument in
place.”62 Consequently, it is possible to bring down “an entire
government” with a “change in vocabulary.”63 Alongside these points,
Fish sets the delight that people take in “the exercise of verbal power.”64
Here, we have a basis on which to extract from his oeuvre support for the
proposition that there is no such thing as a safe space. This is a conclusion
that fits with the view Fish takes of humankind. On his account, people
are restless, assertive, and, inventive. He makes this clear when he states
that, in academic and practical contexts, “there is no final word”—only
the words that follow those that are supposed to be final.65 These points
provide a basis on which to conclude that Fish presents us with a political
anthropology that makes him (like Thomas Hobbes) one who “deal[s] in
darkness.”66 For he draws attention to our ability to use words in ways
that undercut the foundations of contexts (interpretive communities) that,
at least in some instances, invest our lives with significance. But, at this
point, we must note a further feature of Fish’s thinking (to which Olson
does draw attention). This is Fish’s commitment to “academicizing.”
A COMPLEX CONTRIBUTION
By “academicizing” Fish means a virtue that should find expression
in the work of academics. Fish tells us that one who academicizes seeks
to work up an accurate account of the particular field(s) in which he or
she undertakes research.67 This approach to academic work has a
corollary that limits its scope. To academicize is to resist the impulse to
stake out substantive positions on controversial topics. For example, an
academic who adopts this approach to law might map the contours of a
particular legal system and seek to offer an exhaustive account of all the
substantive positions that exist within it.68 But he or she would not argue
for the adoption of any of these positions. This is an approach to academic
work that Olson could have probed in ways that would have brought out
complexities in Fish’s thinking. He might have done this by reference to
the liberal legal systems on which Fish has written. We find within such
systems a dense array of institutions, practices, and norms. They are
contexts that tend to enmesh those who engage in disputes in a host of
complexities. Fish drives this point home over and over again in essays
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ANTIHUMANISM: MILTON AND OTHERS 262 (2012).
Id. at 245.
Fish, supra note 61, at 286.
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, HOBBES ON CIVIL ASSOCIATION 6 (Liberty Fund, 2000) (1975).
STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME 27–30 (2008).
See HANS KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS XVI–XVII (1950) (advocating the approach to legal scholarship
described in the text).
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that dwell on systems of law in which the predictable response to an
argument is a counterargument. We tend to bemoan law on this model on
account of the time and energy it eats up. But given the political
anthropology that, on our earlier analysis, is at work in Fish’s thinking, it
has much to recommend it. For it exerts a civilizing (if often costly)
influence on disagreement. In this way, Fish helps us to understand how
societies whose members are restless and assertive can simultaneously be
well-ordered. For this reason, we might categorize him as an institutional
history man. This is because he gives us resources (his account of
interpretive communities and the political anthropology that informs his
writings) with which to track complex processes of institutional
development that extend along lengthy timelines.69
This contribution brings with it complexities that do not come into
view in Olson’s exposition. The political anthropology that we have
detected in Fish’s writings is rather bleak and, as such, controversial.
Thus it sits awkwardly alongside his commitment to academicizing.
Likewise, the deterministic embeddedness thesis (which informs his
account of interpretive communities) stands in an awkward relationship
with writings on rhetoric that tell a story of human agency and thus sound
a liberal note. These features of Fish’s contribution reveal tensions within
it that we can only examine briefly here. The tension between the
determinism at work in communitarianism and human agency may reveal
Fish to be something of a “trimmer.” To “trim” is to steer a middle course
between “polar positions.”70 Such an approach makes sense when we
recognize that both communitarianism and liberal counterarguments that
emphasize agency have great plausibility. Moreover, the decision to steer
between these positions is the sort of thing we might expect from a thinker
who is committed to academicizing. For Fish is able to make plausible
descriptive claims without having to plump either for communitarianism
or liberalism (each of which is normatively controversial). However,
matters are more awkward for him when we turn to the anthropological
assumptions that find expression in his writings. If he were to bring these
assumptions into clear view, he would place a large question mark over
his commitment to academicizing. Consequently, we find him poised
between these assumptions and his favored approach to academic work.
Here, he takes on the appearance not of a trimmer but of one wrestling
with the sort of performative contradiction that can induce aporia.71 The
69 Fish, supra note 26, at 147 (identifying interpretive communities as “temporal phenomena”
in which we find a “base of agreement” that yields “systematic and conventional” grounds for
disagreement).
70 Cass Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2009).
71 On performative contradiction, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE
OF MODERNITY: TWELVE LECTURES 127 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 1987) (identifying it as a
problem that arises from the adoption of a position that “outstrips itself”). On “aporia” as a “pathless
path” (on which people who face “insoluble problems” lose direction), see DAVID LODGE, THE
ART OF FICTION 219–20 (1992).
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contradiction that, at this point, comes into focus arises from the
performance we might call “being Stanley Fish.” “Being Stanley Fish”
involves delivering a not entirely stable admixture of academic
puritanism (academicizing) and a controversial political anthropology
that presents itself as a clear-eyed account of how things stand with
people. While the delivery of this performance gives rise to difficulties,
we should recognize the benefits it has yielded. For example, it has
enabled Fish to challenge the idealizing tendencies in Dworkin’s writings
on the law. Where Dworkin has found in legal “principles” the stuff of an
egalitarian community, Fish has detected “the rhetorical accompaniments
of practices in search of good public relations.”72
Each of the tensions in Fish’s thinking on which we have dwelt
invites exploration and seems likely to open up possibilities for
development. Thus, while we may share with Morris Zapp the aim of
putting “a definitive stop” to debate on the subjects we examine, there
clearly remains much more to be said on Fish. Terms like “interpretive
community,” “interdisciplinarity,” and “rhetoric,” do not give us an
exhaustive account of the terrain he leads us through. Had Olson’s
analysis been more searching, he would have given us a more complete
account of the depths and ranges of Fish’s contribution. In this way he
would have enriched the drama of development on which he dwells.
CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, Olson could have done more with Fish. But while
this is the case, he offers an informative account of his life and throws
light on a process of development that has seen Fish become a powerful
academic player. Fish emerges from this book as a vivid, engaging
personality, with the acuity to seize opportunities and make the most of
them. However, Olson’s exposition (while full of enthusiasm for its
subject) has a flat, underwhelming quality. This is because he fails to take
from Fish one of his most important lessons. Within limits, opportunities
arise to move our understanding of the objects we scrutinize in new
directions. In Fish’s case, the academic community has set these limits
by identifying, inter alia, the concept of an interpretive community,
interdisciplinarity, and his writings on rhetoric as the things that make
him important. But his contribution is complex and invites critical
reflection—not least because some of the components that make it up
stand in tense relations that merit detailed scrutiny. Here, Olson could
(without turning his biography into a monograph) have given his readers
some useful pointers. But the ambition to do this is absent from his book.
This review has sought to point up the complexity of Fish’s
72 See STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 45 (2001); DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE,
supra note 45, at 211, 213–14, 243.
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contribution by drawing out of it a political anthropology that appears to
inform his thinking. While a practically significant topic, it is far from
being the final word on Fish. But, then, there are, as Fish tells us, no final
words. However, biography is a genre that encourages writers to search
for final words. This is a point to which Pierre Bourdieu lends support
when he observes that it is easy for biographers to read all the “traces” of
a life in the light of an “essence that appears to precede them.”73 Bourdieu
adds that, when we do this, we ascribe to a life a “unity of meaning” that
it lacks and, in this way, fall victim to “illusion.”74 This danger seems to
be particularly acute in the case of individuals who have become well
known for doing significant things. If this point is broadly correct, it has
obvious relevance to Fish. We may end up summarizing his contribution
as having to do with interpretive communities in which rhetoric is the
practical force that Jakobson and Binet seek to capture in the idea of
language’s “seventh function.” However, if we probe Fish’s contribution,
we can draw from it further elements (e.g., political anthropology) that
go some way towards making apparent its richness and the tensions
within it. Thus we have grounds for concluding that Olson has presented
us with a drama of development that has not run its full course.

73
74

PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 55 (Richard Nice trans., 1990).
Id.

